PAROS II

ARCHILOCHOS AND HIS AGE

PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
ON THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF PAROS AND THE CYCLADES
PAROIKIA, PAROS, 7-9 OCTOBER 2005

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ATHENS 2008
Lycambes Gets Capped

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Πάτερ Λυκάμβη, ποιον ἔφράσατο τόδε;
τίς σάς παρήμερε φρένας
ἡς τῷ πρὶν ἡρήκῃσθα; νῦν δὲ δὴ πολὺς
ἀκτοῦσι φαίνει γέλως.
Father Lycambes, what is this you have come up with?
Who has taken away your wits,
which used to be sound? Now indeed you seem
altogether ridiculous to the townspeople.

In the above Fr. 172, Lycambes has just come up with something terrifically stupid, and we have all walked into the room in time to hear everyone else cackling with laughter. Archilochos stands at the front pointing his finger at the culprit, but we are not able to catch his explanation because of all the hubbub. And the red-faced Lycambes has fallen silent.

This is the situation in which we late readers of Archilochos’ poetry are stuck, trying to reconstruct performances from bits and scraps of texts and testimonia. While the fragmentary state of Archilochos’ poetry creates a host of rather obvious challenges in assessing his poetic project (Who is speaking? What words are missing? Where is the narrative going? What is the proper order of the fragments?), comparative anthropology and folklore studies have highlighted a more fundamental problem: the meaning of oral poetry (and, therefore, its genre) is generated through performance. The text itself can only take us so far, even if it is complete and secure. Just as we cannot hope to reconstruct every word of Archilochos’ poetry, so also, we are forced to concede that we will never fully understand the performance context in which Archilochos presented his work. The moment is gone, and the best we can do is to refine our working models of poetic performance. While a great deal of effort has been expended on determining certain aspects of this context, other dimensions have been less fully explored. Much of what follows relies on the analysis of Archilochos’ discourse strategies to flesh out the agonistic social context of Archilochos’ relationship to Lycambes. While such an approach may yield no new arguments in the debates over the historicity of the Lycambids (“real” people or stock characters) or the venue of iambic
performance (symptic vs. festival), my goal is to help us understand how Archilochos constructed his first-person persona in relation to the greatest bête-noire of his poetry. This methodology will lead to the conclusion that Fr. 172 (and the poem of which it is a part) deals with a rivalry between public performers jockeying for an advantage within their social network.

Scholars have traditionally admitted two explanations, based on careful assessment of text and testimonia, for Lycambes' blunder in Fr. 172: either he has just cancelled the imminent wedding between Archilochos and Neobule, that famous story probably, but not certainly, mentioned by Archilochos somewhere in his verses, or he has broken a great oath, as described in what many consider to be the next fragment (Fr. 173) of the epode (and this oath, of course, may also have something to do with the marriage):

ορκον δ’ ἐνοστισθης μέγαν
άλας τε καὶ τράπεζαν.

*You have turned your back on a great oath*

Sworn by salt and table.

I suggest a third possible reconstruction of the situation based on a close analysis of Archilochos' construction of Lycambes' character. Namely, I argue that Lycambes is styled as a failed rival to Archilochos in the arena of public performance, i.e. someone who unsuccessfully challenged the poets' worth and standing in society. I say "styled" because such a depiction is merely the impression that Archilochos wants us to have; it may or may not correspond to any historical reality about Lycambes outside of Archilochos' verses (if, that is, he existed at all outside that poetic world).

In the first section of this paper, I will set out my reasons for rejecting a causal connection between the laughter in Fr. 172 and the perjury in Fr. 173, a necessary act of demolition that will clear the way for constructing my argument, since it is widely assumed that the broken oath of Fr. 173 is the reason for the attack in Fr. 172. In the second section I will piece together the evidence within the epode itself for reading Lycambes as a performative rival.

My first point, then, is that the laughter we hear in Fr. 172 should not be explained by the perjury of Fr. 173, and that the two issues - laughter and perjury - are discordant enough that we should resist the urge to follow West in placing them in close proximity. Such a separation of these two fragments is nothing new, but my reasons for rejecting West's arrangement form an important preliminary step to proposing a new explanation of Lycambes' lost words. Unless the contiguous pairing of these two fragments is destabilized, there is no compelling reason to rethink West's arrangement and the causal relationship between laughter and perjury that it implies.

In support of a close connection between the two fragments, it has recently been argued that in a shame-based society, such as Paros of Archilochos' day, public laughter would have been an appropriate and powerful response to perjury. Contrary to this view, I maintain that laughter is, in fact, such an inappropriate response that we cannot closely link Frs. 172 and 173. Christopher Brown has used the Homeric story of Ares and Aphrodite caught in flagrante as told by Demodocos in the *Odyssey* (8.266-369) as a model for understanding the shaming power of laughter and public derision. Brown's argument, however, does not adequately explain away the strong evidence that it may well be Hephaistos, rather than Ares and Aphrodite, who is the butt
of the joke, as he frequently is in Archaic art.9 Such a possibility becomes more likely in light of the social dynamics at the Phaeacian party where this scandalous song is performed. The song works to ease the tensions created by the testy exchange between Odysseus and Euryalos. In fact, a survey of words based on the same root as gelōs yields no clear archaic example of laughter acting as a form of strong social control.

The evidence suggests that it is important to distinguish between ritual and popular forms of invective abuse, on the one hand, and public laughter, on the other. While aischrologia and similar forms of harsh and amusing speech clearly were, in certain circumstances, conceived as having the power to change social relations, gel- words cannot be shown to have the same associations. Laughter must have frequently accompanied efficacious abuse, but it is not, on its own, efficacious. Even strongly derisive laughter, such as the Achaeans’ guffawing at Thersites at Iliad 2.270, seems to reinforce a social standing that is already determined rather than bringing about a new standing through the power of shaming laughter. I.e. the Achaeans laugh because Odysseus has already put Thersites in his place; they do not laugh in order to achieve that goal. Similarly, Odysseus and the Phaeacians rejoiced, terpet’ eni phresin (8.368), at the conclusion of the song about Ares and Aphrodite, again following the pattern of verbal challenge (from Euryalos), successful confrontation of the challenger (by Odysseus), and a mirthful release of tension (Demodocos’ song and everyone’s response to it).10 Thus, if the gods do not laugh in order to shame Ares and Aphrodite, then we have very little support for reading the laughter in Fr. 172 as an Archilochean tactic to shame Lycambes for breaking the oath in Fr. 173.

More to the point, however, is the fact that, regardless of how we understand the role of laughter in the marital problems of Hephaistos and Aphrodite, the breaking of an oath cannot be shown to be a laughing matter without recourse to Frs. 172-3. Quite the contrary, broken oaths are serious, dangerous business, whereas words built from the stem gel-, cruelly derisive as they may be, are not used in early Greek poetry as a means of remedying a serious threat to the integrity of the community. Hesiod tells us that among the gods anyone who breaks a megas horkos must spend one year in a coma and another nine years excluded from the company of the other divinities (Th. 793-803); Achaean speakers in the Iliad regularly connect the ultimate doom of Troy to the violation of the oath sworn in Book 3 (e.g. 4.157, 4.236; cf. 7.351);11 and Alcaeus emblematizes his anger against Pittacos over the civil strife on Lesbos through mention of his enemy’s perjury (Fr. 129.21-24). In many of these texts, the targets of abuse are known from other sources to have been skillful speakers, further supporting my contention that Lycambes is a verbal rival. In none of these cases is laughter involved.

A final example from an Aesopic fable both reiterates the seriousness of oaths and provides several points of contact with iambos. The story12 tells how Horkos, the personified god of oaths, meets a man planning to commit perjury, drags him to the top of a cliff, and hurls him to his death.13 The manner of execution evokes literary and ritual patterns involving the pharmakos, and the fact that Horkos is lame, kholos, recalls Hipponax’s limping choliambic meter. But beyond these iambic connections, the story seems to suggest that perjury is a serious community-wide concern as highlighted by the Fact that Horkos encounters the would-be oath-breaker at the gates, pylai, of the city. The transgression of an oath represents the violation of a sacred socie-
tal boundary. This is symbolized physically by the city gates, etymologically by the connection suggested between horkos, oath, and herkos, boundary, and punitively by the pharmakos-like punishment of the perjurer. In archaic poetry laughter—even derisive public laughter—is not the expected response to the breaking of an oath. In the following pages, therefore, I will seek to explain what Lycambes may have said or done in Fr. 172 and why it has rendered him gelôs without reference to Fr. 173. Specifically, I will argue that Lycambes’ behavior may well have included criticism of Archilochos’ role as a poetic performer within the community. To demonstrate this point, I turn now to the evidence from the epode itself.

The first important step toward understanding Lycambes as a performer has already been taken: whatever Lycambes has contrived or planned, ephrasô, Archilochos claims that the general public has responded with laughter. This means that Archilochos wants us to understand Lycambes’ behavior as enacted upon the stage of public perception. Whether he willingly stepped into this crucible of scrutiny or if Archilochos has forced him into the spotlight against his will, Lycambes has entered the world of social performance; he exists, for us, in that arena in which a man’s standing in the community can rise or fall through the collective response to his actions, words, and behavior.

Richard Martin has shown that it was largely in these displays of public contestation that both Homeric heroes and the Seven Sages constructed and promoted their standing within their respective communities.14 I suggest that a similar dynamic can be found in the lines of Archilochos. His iambics portray a conflict in which the speaker vaunts his own position by undermining that of a rival. Whether such an interchange can be shown to be historical or a mimetic game is, at the level of poetics, immaterial.

What is important at this point is to keep in mind that Lycambes’ obvious performative failure derives solely from Archilochos’ own pleading efforts in that same contentious showcase of bravura and ambition. We are not yet (and may never be) in a position to decide whether Lycambes will turn out to be a Thersites or a Cleon. The inability of the former to present himself and his opinions in a positive light in Iliad 2 shows the consequences of overreaching one’s grasp, while the latter’s election to an Athenian generalship in the immediate aftermath of Aristophanes’ pillorying of him in Equites cautions that the poetics of attack may succeed as poetry (Aristophanes won the prize for his play) but fail to ruin the standing of its target.15 All we can say for the moment is that Archilochos is coaxing us to join in the laughter, and the blunt eloquence of this coerced response seeks to divert us from considering too closely what Lycambes has actually done. As Theodor Adorno knew, “he who has laughter on his side has no need of proof”. It may be more important to ask, therefore, not what Lycambes has done or said, but how successful Archilochos has been in rousing a universal, derisive laughter at Lycambes’ expense.

So although we are left to guess what Lycambes has done, Archilochos does give us several clues about how he did it. The poet’s words importantly reveal a form of double-speak in which lexical units simultaneously encode opposite meanings.16 Perhaps most importantly, èrèrêstha from arariskó, “join closely, put together” in Fr. 172, evokes characteristics of both a verbal adept and a mentally unhinged fool. On the positive side, arariskó is implicated in the process of poetic composition, as in the Homeric Hymn to Apollo’s description of a choral performance (Hom. Hymn, 164):
Their beautiful song was put together in this way.

Additionally, Gregory Nagy has suggested that Homer's name derives ultimately from the same root as *arariskó* and evokes "he who fits [the song] together". Combining these two points creates the possibility that Lycambes was not merely competent, but eloquent or even poetic prior to the gaff alluded to in Fr. 172. Pushing this connection to the extreme moves us toward the intriguing, though unlikely, interpretation that the speaker in this fragment asks how Lycambes, for all his demonstrable talent in the past, has produced such wretched doggerel on this occasion.

The negative connotations of *arariskó* derive from associations with the only other combination of a form of this verb with someone's *phrenes*, "wits", in Archaic literature outside of Fr. 172. In the story of Elpenor in the *Odyssey* a similar juxtaposition of words suggests that in the so-called "first epode" Archilochos is working to destabilize Lycambes' standing in the community by implying that his *phrenes*, which ought to be mature and reliable, are actually incapable of generating wisdom. As Odysseus leaves behind the magical world of Circe's island he laments the demise of his young crewmate, who fell to his death because he foolishly chose to sleep-off his drunkenness on top of a roof. Odysseus describes Elpenor as having *phrenes* that are not *aréroś*, "not well-ordered" (*Od. 10.553*). Early medical lore makes clear that normally one's *phrenes* grow apace with the natural increase of the body. As such, it is understandable that the youngest member of Odysseus' crew should demonstrate such fatally bad judgment, but the older Lycambes has no excuse for his senselessness. Without insisting on any direct or overly-textual connection, I suspect that Elpenor's situational myopia has bearing on Archilochos' rhetorical strategy against Lycambes inasmuch as he describes his older rival in terms similarly applied to a foolish youth. The word *pater*, "father", with which the epode begins, sarcastically twists the knife by undermining this term of maturity and honor with intimations of youthful ineptitude. Archilochos, then, begins his attack from a subordinate position, since the older man ought to have greater authority on public matters.

The example of Nestor and Diomedes in *Iliad* 9 represents the ultimate model of verbal interaction between an elder and a youth, and the contrast between this Homeric model and Archilochos' epode shows how deeply iambic invective can bite against the traditional social order. Nestor, the consummate elder statesman, compliments Diomedes for the mature quality of his advice to the Achaeans leaders, but he also reasserts his own predominance and relegates Diomedes' efforts to second-tier greatness. Nestor puts Diomedes gently in his place with three clear references to his inferior standing in the age-based hierarchy. He begins by addressing the younger man as "son of Tydeus", a mark of honor to be sure but also a tacit reminder that Nestor himself is an age-mate of the father rather than the son. He then says that Diomedes is the best of his peers in counsel, a pointedly limited sphere of greatness. Finally, he claims that he could be Diomedes' father. All of this works to re-assert and re-articulate the social order in the Achaean camp where verbal renown naturally belongs to the most experienced (i.e. oldest) of the heroes.

In Fr. 172 Archilochos' speaker seeks to smash this glass ceiling of seniority by undercutting the older man's standing within that system. Such a scheme rests on a razor's edge since the
narrator must discredit his opponent without overplaying his own hand. Archilochos seeks to strike this balance by insisting that Lycambes’ mind is like that of a young, foolish man. If an old man cannot boast of strong, coherent phrenes then his age becomes pitiful; the young iambist cleverly reverses the positive, craftsman-like process inherent in the verb arariskō, “join” or “construct”, in order to cast himself as more mentally mature than the foolish old Lycambes. Archilochos sets in tense opposition the positive connotations of arariskō for Lycambes’ past (he was formerly talented) with the implications of its effective negation in the present (his phrenes are now unhinged).

We may conclude that in the world of Archaic Greek social interactions one who is a master joiner is like a skilled poet while one who has altogether lost this skill quickly washes out of the social “gene pool”. The positive, complimentary poetic connotations of the verb are not only negated but totally reversed by associations with the same pattern of youthful folly that dooms Elpenor. Whatever Lycambes has said, it appears to be dangerously out of line with his former, commendable reputation.

This message is reinforced by the implications of the epode’s first word, pater, “father”. Like the dual connotations of arariskō, pater works simultaneously in two different semantic directions. The word can be used as a general honorific term, as at Odyssey 8.145 where Athena, disguised as a Phaeacian girl, calls Odyssey xeine pater, “welcomed sir”, but as Carey and Brown have noted, in Fr. 172 it is obviously ironic or insulting inasmuch as it recalls the familial relationship that nearly existed between the two men.21 I suspect that the irony works at a deeper poetic level as well. The combination of the word pater with a proper name is ubiquitously associated in archaic poetry with only one figure: Zeus. This pairing occurs dozens of times in Homer (even without including the instances in which Zeus is referred to with some circumlocution rather than his actual name), is frequent throughout Archaic poetry, and appears four times in Archilochos. In Fr. 197 someone laments, “Father Zeus, I have had no marriage”! This statement is most easily interpreted as referring to the broken marriage promise and, therefore, likely derives from the same anti-Lycambes cycle of poetry as the first epode. Fr. 177 below, which is regularly considered to be part of the first epode, is a prayer for justice apparently spoken by the Aesopic fox to herself and opens with an invocation of Father Zeus:22

Ω Ζευ, πάτερ Ζευ, σόν μὲν οὐρανοῦ κράτος,
σὺ δ’ ἔργη ἔπτ᾽ ἀνθρώπων ὀφάς,
λεωράχα καὶ θεματά, σοὶ δὲ θηρίων
ὕβρις τε καὶ δίκη μέλει.

Zeus, father Zeus, heaven’s power is yours;
you see the deed of men
dastardly and just, and the violence and justice
of beasts is your domain as well.

From both the wider Archaic context and the more immediate connection between Frs. 172 and 177 (and perhaps Fr. 197 as well), it would appear that to say “father Lycambes” may also recall “father Zeus”. While no mortal can hope to live up to such a lofty comparison, we might imagine a Priam or an Agamemnon being exalted by such flattery as the terrestrial representa-
tives of Zeus’ heavenly paternity. For Lycambes, however, the comparison merely highlights his shortcomings. For Archilochos to address Lycambes in this way, then, furthers his goal of eroding the age-based hierarchy which places the older man above the younger in terms of public standing. The term *pater* is a particularly effective form of ironic address from a younger speaker, both because it challenges the authority society naturally accords to the older man and because, in Fr. 177, the Archilochean fox calls upon the real *pater*, Zeus, to render judgment against the Lycambean eagle; father Zeus trumps papa Lycambes. Archilochos’ strategy for supplanting his older rival’s public standing hinges on the decline of Lycambes’ *phrenes*, “wits”. It is this change which makes the word *pater* such a subtle invective tool. Panning out, therefore, we can see that the poet’s diction in Fr. 172 (the layers of meanings of *arariskó* as a retrospective compliment and contemporary insult, and the ironic tone of *pater*) demands a wider discussion of how and why one’s *phrenes* change.

Archaic examples abound of *phrenes* being altered. Roughly speaking, the examples fall into two categories: the aphro-dionysiac version in which someone temporarily loses control of his wits through the ecstatic influence of wine, lust or music, and the darker alternative in which a god clouds someone’s rational faculties precisely at a moment when they are sorely needed. Although Archilochos presents several examples of the former, sympotic version of losing one’s *phrenes*, comparative evidence makes clear that in Fr. 172 Lycambes fits into the latter category, a poetic move that shows Archilochos performing a strong ethical judgment against his adversary.23

The *Iliad* in particular is filled with examples of this darker pattern in which a divinity takes away, deludes or destroys someone’s (or, more rarely, a group’s) *phrenes* with dire results. The divinity beguiles the mortal into making a critical mistake which almost invariably leads to disaster.24 Prime examples of this are to be found in Achilles’ justifiable charge that Zeus had taken away (*heileto*) Agamemnon’s *phrenes* leading the king to stubbornly marginalize his greatest warrior to the detriment of the entire army (9.377), Atè snatching away (*heile*) Patroclus’ *phrenes* just after he has been struck by Apollo and rendered defenseless to the weapons of Euphorbos and Hector (16.805), and Athena stealing (*heileto*) the *phrenes* of the Trojans so that they favor Hector’s rash plan to return to battle and face the now berserk Achilles (18.311). While forms of *haire6, “take”, are most common, other verbs are less frequently used to convey the same basic idea.25

In terms of Fr. 172 this more destructive form of *phrenes*-manipulation raises two critical points. First, the person whose *phrenes* are altered in this manner is on course for disaster. Second, the answer to the question about who has taken away Lycambes’ wits must be one of the gods. While there is no need to suggest that someone is about to attack Lycambes physically, we must assume that his actions have rendered him at least as ridiculous as the Homeric Glaucus whose deluded wits led him to exchange gold armor for bronze. One of the gods has removed Lycambes’ ability to reason, rendering him open to, in this case, the performance of a public and poetic attack from his enemy. The immediate result of this attack is that we laugh. We laugh because Lycambes’ divine protection has been removed, and we are, therefore, merely affirming and accepting the judgment of the god.

While it could be argued that Lycambes’ delusion and the popular laughter at his expense are all related to the breaking of the marriage arrangement, Archilochos’ version of the fable of the fox and the eagle suggests a more reciprocal, competitive dynamic. The fable has regularly
been read as a window into an earlier stage in the relationship between Archilochos and Lycambes based on the fable’s opening focus on the agreement between the two animals to establish friendly relations. By reading the fox as Archilochos and the eagle as Lycambes, Elizabeth Irwin and Christopher Brown have argued independently that the fable in its Archilochean context hinges on issues of human fertility which connect back with the interest of the testimonia in the broken marriage.26

This line of interpretation makes abundant sense, but it fails to offer a sufficient explanation for a striking Archilochean innovation in the fable: the eagle, who represents Lycambes, mocks the Archilochean fox. This important adaptation opens the door to a second (perhaps complementary) reading which reveals Lycambes as performing his rejection of Archilochos in some sort of public forum. In the poet’s version of the fable, the eagle mocks (elaphrizon) the fox’s anger and frustration at her inability to take revenge for the death of her young. At this point the eagle/Lycambes has temporarily trumped the fox’s/Archilochos’ poetic voice, and we are beset by a crisis of fertility and a breakdown of community as a result of the eagle’s disregard for the fox’s verbal authority.

How are we to understand this new twist on the tale? The idea of inter-species harmony is long gone from the moment the eagle snatches up the young foxes, so the eagle’s mockery comes too late to sever its bond with the fox. Similarly, such derisive thumbing of the nose at a helpless opponent is out of keeping with the depiction of the eagle up to this point or the typical characterization of eagles (and birds of prey more generally) in fable narratives. Rather, the eagle’s behavior, enacted from a position of presumed safety because of physical elevation, seems to be a contemptuous dismissal of the fox’s power. That power, as Irwin has noted, is explicitly shown to be poetic in Fr. 177 and, ultimately, more efficacious than the eagle had presumed.27

When we translate this scenario back to the human realm, Lycambes emerges as a rival who smugly rejects Archilochean poetics because (in part) of his “elevated” age. The eagle’s taunting of the poetic fox who, in the end, takes vengeance on the eagle’s chicks, maps onto what we know of Archilochos’ relationship with the Lycambids only when we accept that Lycambes is portrayed as challenging the iambist’s poetry with an abusive performance of his own.28 The first epode, then, dramatizes a conflict in which the speaker lashes out with an aggressive riposte at an older rival in an attempt to leap-frog his way to higher standing within the group. Archilochos’ response to his rival’s mockery is cast as an Aesopic fantasy in which the poetic voice of the (temporarily) subordinate speaker finds ultimate victory through his efficacious words.

As a final twist to this Aesopic narrative of competition, I suggest that Archilochos memorializes his victory in the name Lycambes. The mention of iambic names resurrects the old debates over the historicity of named characters within Archilochos’ poetry, and while many commentators are once again persuaded that Lycambes was a real, historical person, the matter is certainly not settled in any definitive way.29 Rather than advocating one side or the other, I will draw upon the idea, proposed by Bonanno some years ago, that Lycambes is a nickname.30 In light of my suggestion that Lycambes is a performative rival of Archilochos, it is important to emphasize the relevance of the word iambos as a perceived semantic element in Lycambes’ name.31 As the victim of Archilochos’ iambics, and especially if his critical voice derives ultimately from
Archilochos' poetry, Lycambes is closely attached to the social negotiation at work within that poetic universe. As a wolf, *lykos*, he is, as Gernet has shown, an outsider on the basis of Indo-European associations with wolves as symbols of ostracized loners. His name, then, would evoke "the man who has become an outsider through the power of *iambos*". This type of malicious sobriquet need not preclude the possibility of a real, historical figure skulking behind the name; nor should it imply any full-fledged or specific ritual process. As a perjuror and a personal enemy, Archilochos' target was ripe for a harsh attack, but as someone who challenged the very power of the poet's abusive weapon, it is fitting that Lycambes' name bears the titular scar of *iambos*.

NOTES

1. All translations are my own.

2. My approach to performance theory follows the eclectic discussion of Martin (1989), 4-42. Martin's approach to Iliadic grammar (1989) and his later analysis of stories about the Seven Sages (1993) both demonstrate "the importance of performance as the distinguishing feature of all speech events", see Martin (1989), 10.

3. For the latest overview and analysis of the "ritual approach" and the "secular approach" to Archaic *iambos*, see Kantzios (2005), 12-20.

4. This is in no way meant to deny that a broken marriage pact may have caused problems in their relationship. Understanding Archilochos and Lycambes as competitors and performers merely adds a new layer of contestation between them. By public I mean to imply nothing more than that this contestation took place before some relevant portion of the larger social unit. A sympotic setting, therefore, would be no less public in my interpretation than a mass festival. Either venue would allow for the construction of an individual's identity and reputation that could influence his standing in the community at large.

5. West (1974), 132, assumes that the two fragments should be taken as a pair. The rationale for including the two fragments in the same poem derive from metrical similarities and circumstantial evidence provided by Origen (Contr. Cels. 2.21), who explicitly claims that Fr. 173 derives from Archilochos' invective against Lycambes, and Dio (Or. 74.16), who indicates that the oath had been sworn to contract a marriage agreement. None of this, however, provides any indication of the original arrangement of the epode.

6. Lassere (1950), Treu (1959), and Tarditi (1968), all print Fr. 173 toward the end of the epode as a retrospective on the speaker's charges against Lycambes rather than as a direct explanation of Fr. 172.


8. Brown (1989), 285 understands this tale as "highly moral in its account of adultery exposed and punished". His assessment does not necessarily preclude my opinion that the song serves to diffuse the tension that existed prior to the song since *ridentem dicere verum quid vetat*.

9. In addition to the prime example of Hephaistos as the object of laughter at *Iliad* 1.599, the baby Hephaistos is also mocked by the gods at Alcaios 349A; furthermore, images of the lame god sitting drunkenly on a donkey are common and obviously comical, e.g. the François Krater (c. 570; Florence 4209). Brown (1989), 287, says of the scene in *Iliad* 1 that "[h]owever close the verbal parallel here to the passage in *Od*. 8, it should not be allowed to obscure the important differences between the two passages". I prefer to follow the assessment of Garvie (1994), s.v. 266-369: "[Homer] exploits the humour of a marriage between a misshapen god and the goddess of beauty... Here the adultery of Ares and Aphrodite is simply amusing, both for the other gods and for [Homer's] audience... and it ends happily with easy reconciliation, like the quarrel at the end of *Il. 11*".

10. Brown (1989), 289, draws upon the examples of Sophocles' Ajax and Euripides' Medea as characters whose actions are influenced by a fear of becoming the object of others' laughter. I suspect, however, that the sub-
jective fear of laughter expressed by these haughty, heroic characters is quite different from the objective
delight in laughing at a Hephaestos or a Thersites.
11. In light of the story of the group suicide of the Lycambids, it is interesting to note that at IL. 3.299 the prayer
associated with the oath ceremony includes the stipulation that whoever breaks the oath will not only die,
but will also forfeit the lives of his children and lose his wife to slavery.
13. For similar acts of justice carried out by Horkos, see Hes. Erga 219 and Th. 232.
15. Such dire confrontations within an oral culture are alive and well even today. The contentious smack-talk be-
tween rap stars Ja Rule and 50 Cent was so bitter and efficacious that not only did Ja Rule's popularity
plummet for a time, but each star has accused the other of sponsoring violence against his rival. For a fas-
cinating account of the very personal, very catty and very clever repartee between taarab singers in Tanzania,
see Askew (2002). Collins (2004), 63-83 has developed a very persuasive picture of competitive poetic per-
formance in early Greece that relies on a broad range of comparative anthropological information.
16. The classic starting point for this type of language play is Derrida (1981), 61-84. Derrida examines the impor-
tance of the word pharmakon in Plato's Phaedros and shows this word, which can be translated as either
"poison" or "medicine", always evokes both meanings at once.
18. The main thrust of Martin (1993) is that the conceptual category of "sage" in the Archaic world was predi-
cated on performances of wisdom. Archilochos' words deny Lycambes any approach to this status.
in this instance surely refers to one's mental capabilities rather than the physical part of the body known as
the phrēn, since an assertion that the chest grows with the body is rather too obvious.
21. Carey (1986), 60; Brown (1997), 55-56. Both argue that pater is particularly relevant since Lycambes is at-
tacked in his capacity as a father. My comments seek to add to, rather than contradict, their arguments.
22. The idea, now generally accepted, that the fox is speaking to herself, was first proposed by Mette (1961),
though this identification is not certain. Brown (1997) 62, n. 68 seems to favor the idea that the eagle speaks
these lines tauntingly to the fox.
23. Archilochean examples from the first category include Pericles' gluttonous belly leading his phrenes astray
(parēgagen) in Fr. 124b with the result that he barges uninvited into a symposium and shamelessly guls-
hes wine without paying his share; the narrator of Fr. 191 having his weak phrenes stolen away (klepas)
by his desire for sex; and in Fr. 120 the speaker's phrenes being drenched (sugkeranōtheis) with wine as he leads
the Dithyramb. Similar instances of this type of altered phrenes suggest that the condition describes mo-
ments when some erotic stimulus overrides all rational control. The situation is temporary, remediable (most
easily through the satiety resulting from indulging the erotic urge), and relatively harmless. The case of Peri-
cles in Fr. 124b, however, could have been an early stage in an escalating conflict. Collins (2004), 63 ff., par-
ticularly 71, outlines the ways in which excessive drinking at symposia could move from typical, friendly trash
talk to unbridled invective and, if tempers were not cooled, physical violence.
24. The exception seems to be the description of Glaucos' famously bad exchange of gold armor for bronze. Our
text clearly depicts Glaucos as being duped, but the consequences of this are not dire.
25. At 7.360 Paris claims that the gods have destroyed, (αἴλεσαν), Antenor's phrenes for suggesting that Helen be
given back; at 12.234 Hector uses the same phrase in reference to Polydamas' opposition to Hector's plan
to press the battle at the Achaean ships. Examples could be multiplied, but the interesting point may be that
in the Iliad (though not throughout Archaic poetry) the verb haireō seems to imply a greater degree of narrar-
tive certitude. In the two examples just cited, one could easily argue that Paris and Hector are both mistaken.
In cases where forms of haireō are used, however, the characters' phrenes are unarguably deluded.
26. This is, of course, neither the only nor the usual way to interpret the fable. Brown (1997), 65-6, and Irwin
(1998), 179-182, have both stressed the importance of fertility to the context of a broken marriage vow, and
van Dijk (1997), 144, in his valuable study of fables in a vast array of classical literature, puts the emphasis on the inevitable punishment of perjury. I do not believe that the fable demands a single interpretation and, therefore, see nothing wrong with maintaining all of these readings as viable, complementary alternatives.  

27. Irwin (1998), 181-182 compares Archilochean and Hesiodic uses of fables and concludes that Archilochos' fox is speaking poetry and, in particular, Hesiodic poetry.  

28. It is interesting to note that the eagle is also the symbol of Zeus. While birds of prey are frequent players in fables and we should not casually assume that such a creature stands in for a figure outside the metaphorical world of animals, it is curious that Archilochos seems to be associated with complexes of god-hero antagonism as outlined by Nagy (1979), 289 ff. Archilochos was both killed by someone nicknamed Corax, a name that has Apolline associations, and avenged by Delphic pronouncements; he may also have been discredited though some Dionysiac influence only to be restored and elevated through Dionysos' will (see below); given the fact that an Archilochean fable may be far more complex than its traditional Aesopic model, might there not be an element of such antagonism with Zeus as well? Zeus is the eagle who destroys the fox's family, but also the divine power upon which the fox relies for justice. It should also be remembered, in this vein, that Archilochean poetry, just like lamentations for Achilles, has connections with Zeus' Olympia as hinted at by Pindar (Ol. 9.1-4) and discussed in the scholia.  

29. Carey (1986) is most often cited as the best case against West (1974) 27, who argues that Lycambes is a stock character whose name derives from "a traditional entertainment with some (perhaps forgotten) ritual basis". Brown (1997), 40-41, reinforces many of Carey's arguments: "In light of the large number of redende Namen in Greek, the central argument concerning names is specious".

30. Bonanno (1980). Cpo Gentili (1982), 24, n. 51. The basis for this line of reasoning in modern scholarship derives from a rhetorical question posed by West (1974), 26: "Is it not remarkable that the same element -amb- appears in the name of a figure who plays a recurrent part in the iambi of the most celebrated exponent of the genre?" Such speculation runs starkly against the opinion of Burnett (1983), 22 who sees the connections between iambos and Lycambes as an unfortunate coincidence that made him "a ready target for an abusive poet who liked to exploit animal fables as a mode of attack..."

31. Most commentators who have dissected Lycambes' name have placed the emphasis on the importance of -amb-, "step" rather than on the larger poetic concept of iambos (a concept of which Archilochos was well aware in light of Fr. 215: καὶ μ᾽ ὄφτ' ἱαμβόνων ὄστε τερπολόξων μέλες), e.g. West (1974), 26-27; Nagy (1979), 242. This approach emphasizes the idea of a "wolf-walker" in the name. Although strictly speaking iambos cannot be at the root of Lycambes' name (it would have to be Lykiambos), I feel that it is unlikely that this connection was not felt on some level, and I see no reason to assume that a name so central to Archilochos' poetics should privilege one set of associations to the exclusion of the other.

32. Gernet (1981), cf. Nagy (1979), 242, n. 4; Brown (1997), 56, makes the point, suggested to him by S.R. Slings, that the tone of the word pater that begins Fr. 172 "effectively treats Lycambes as a stranger and so puts him outside the community..."  

33. On the intriguing connections with wolf rituals, see Gernet (1981) and Burkert (1972), 84-93.  

34. For a sampling of the fascinating scholarship on the manipulation of names in invective traditions, see Rosen (1988) for the suggestion that Hipponax's Bupalos can be understood as a play on bous-phallos, "bull dick;" Zanetto (2001) for name games in Aristophanes; and, a bit further afield, Ward (1973), 132 for the Old Irish tradition of ail poetry, which is based on derisive manipulations of names and nicknames.
BIBLIOGRAPHY